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ABSTRACT
The transnational free flow of capital represents one of the core
factors driving the globalization of the world since the beginning of the
Bretton-Woods era. Under the "traditional" Neoliberal theory of
globalization, this free flow of capital remains sacrosanct, an
unstoppable force with which state actors cannot and should not
interfere. However, the recent financial crisis has caused some to
question this absolute faith in the benefits of unregulated transnational
capital flows and to assert that the state still has a role to play in
influencing the creation of international norms on capital. Tax haven
regulation represents one area that has seen a significant increase in
interest in the United States since the financial crisis, most notably in
the forms of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act and the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act. Although much has already been written on the
purported benefits and drawbacks of tax haven reform, this note will
instead focus on the view of globalization and the state's role in it that
underlie these pieces of legislation. In short, this note will argue that this
legislation, and the renewed interest in tax haven regulation
surrounding it, represents a shift away from the absolutist neoliberal
view of globalization toward one that both recognizes the potential
benefits of capital-flow regulation and the ability of state actors to use
their domestic law-making capacity to influence the creation of these new
international regulatory norms.
* Executive Production Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D.
Candidate, 2014, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2010, University of
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INTRODUCTION
The 2008 financial crisis has led to widespread rethinking of
national and transnational financial norms.' Indeed, these
restructuring efforts have proven so substantial that some have labeled
them collectively as a second "Bretton Woods," referring to the 1944
Bretton-Woods Conference that led to the establishment of many of the
global financial norms in the post-war era. 2 These efforts at global
financial reform have included a renewed interest in regulating so-
called tax havens. 3 Tax havens are generally defined as "any country
that does not seek to attract real investment, but instead promotes tax
evasion to attract and increase foreign capital held in its jurisdiction
through the use of lenient tax laws and strict bank secrecy."4
Interestingly, these attempts at transnational tax haven reform have
occurred not just at the international level but at the national level as
well. For example, efforts in the U.S. Congress led to the introduction of
two pieces of legislation aimed at dealing with the perceived negative
impacts of tax havens: the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, originally
introduced in 20075 and reintroduced in 2009,6 2011,7 and 2013,8 and
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), originally
introduced in 20099 and enacted as part of the Hiring Incentives to
Restore Employment Act. 10
The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, originally cosponsored by then-
senator Barack Obama, 1' seeks to combat the veil of secrecy
surrounding tax havens through the implementation of four rebuttable
presumptions:
1. See David Spencer, Cross Border Tax-Evasion and Bretton Woods I (Part 1), J.
INT'L TAx'N, May 2009, at 44, 45.
2. Id. at 46.
3. See id. at 45-46.
4. Timothy V. Addison, Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 703, 706 (2009).
5. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. (2007); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act,
H.R. 2136, 110th Cong. (2007).
6. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. (2009); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act,
H.R. 1265, 111th Cong. (2009).
7. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 1346, 112th Cong. (2011); Stop Tax Haven Abuse
Act, H.R. 2669, 112th Cong. (2011).
8. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 1554, 113th Cong. (2013); Stop Tax Haven Abuse
Act, S. 1533, 113th Cong. (2013); Sequester Delay and Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R.
3666, 113th Cong. (2013).
9. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, S. 1934, 111th Cong. (2009).
10. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, H.R. 2847, 111th Cong. (2010).
11. Bruce Zagaris, Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act Reintroduced in U.S. Congress, 25 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 237 (2009).
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(1) Control-if in a tax proceeding a U.S. person (other
than a publicly traded corporation) directly or indirectly,
formed, transferred assets to, and was a beneficiary of,
or received distributions from an OSJ [Offshore Secrecy
Jurisdictions] entity, it will be presumed that the person
exercised control over the entity.
(2) Transfers of income-in a tax proceeding any amount
or thing of value transferred to a U.S. person (other than
a publicly traded corporation) directly or indirectly from
an account or entity in an OSJ, or transferred from such
a U.S. person directly or indirectly to an account or
entity in an OSJ, will be presumed to represent
previously unreported income to the U.S. person in the
year of transfer.
(3) Beneficial ownership-In a proceeding to enforce
securities law, if a U.S. person (other than a publicly
traded corporation) formed, transferred assets to, or
benefitted from an OSJ entity (other than a publicly
traded corporation), it will be presumed that the person
beneficially owned and exercised control over such
entity, regardless of the nominal ownership.
(4) Foreign financial accounts-In lieu of the current law
requiring U.S. taxpayers to report (on the Foreign Bank
Account Report) to the IRS any foreign financial account
containing at least $10,000, the bill establishes a
presumption that any account in an OSJ has funds
sufficient to trigger this reporting requirement.12
The Act also provides for a public list of known tax havens that the
Secretary of the Treasury may update after determining that a
jurisdiction's rules and regulations prevent the United States from
gaining the information necessary to enforce its tax laws.13 Finally, the
Act would strengthen enforcement standards by authorizing the U.S.
12. Id.
13. Id. (naming Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey/Sark/Alderney, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Samoa,
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Switzerland,
Turks and Caicos, and Vanuatu as known tax havens).
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Treasury to impose various sanctions against tax havens and financial
institutions that use its services, by requiring more stringent disclosure
requirements of banks and securities who have U.S. taxpayers as
beneficial owners of their foreign-owned accounts, by increasing the
amount of time allowed for investigating a tax return involving tax
havens, by placing stricter requirements on U.S. beneficiaries of foreign
trusts, and by increasing the penalty for failing to disclose offshore
interests, among other provisions.14
FATCA, although similar in its goal of combating offshore tax
evasion, focuses more primarily on strengthening reporting
requirements.' 5 Specifically, FATCA provides for a 30 percent tax
withholding on payments either to foreign banks and trusts that fail to
disclose U.S. accounts or to foreign corporations who fail to disclose U.S.
interest holders, requires disclosure by U.S. persons of a variety of
interests in a foreign entity, and broadens the definition of who qualifies
as a U.S. beneficiary of a foreign trust requiring disclosure.' 6 FATCA
also imposes stiff monetary penalties against U.S. persons who fail to
make these required disclosures of foreign-held assets and interests.17
The policy merits of these two pieces of legislation and tax haven
regulation in general have already been debated at length.' 8 Indeed,
there remains little consensus on even the precise definition of "tax
haven."19 However, this note will not address the technical merits of
these two pieces of legislation; rather, this note will examine this
legislation in light of the theories of globalization it embodies.
Admittedly, political and pragmatic concerns played a much more overt
role in the creation of these pieces of legislation, and neither embodies
any theory of globalization explicitly or completely. Furthermore, the
globalization theories this note will argue underlie the recent tax-haven
reform efforts predate both these reform efforts and the financial crisis;
neither the financial crisis nor tax haven reform can take credit for their
14. Id.
15. See Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Enacts Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 26 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 193 (2010).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation under High-
Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 727-28 (2012) (critiquing FATCA); Maria Tihin,
The Trouble with Tax Havens: The Need for New Legislation in Combating the Use of
Offshore Trusts in Abusive Tax Shelters, 41 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 417, 432-36 (2008)
(critiquing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act).
19. See Addison, supra note 4, at 705-06 (noting that, based on different factors used,
compiled lists of states designated as tax havens can vary greatly); Tihin, supra note 18,
at 421 (stating that a "very fine line" divides legitimate tax shelters favored by the
legislature and tax laws from abusive tax shelters whose services circumvent the tax
laws).
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introduction into globalization scholarship. This note will seek to show
how this legislation, as a response to the recent financial crisis, reflects
a limited shift in the prevailing view of globalization from one with the
untouchable free flow of capital at its core toward one where states can
positively influence the creation of new transnational capital norms. To
that end, Part I will first provide an overview of the "traditional"
neoliberal theory of globalization, with its emphasis on the primacy of
the market and capital mobility, and will discuss how the traditional
view of tax havens reflected this worldview. Part II will then examine
emerging alternate theories of globalization that question the sanctity of
unregulated capital flows and allow for an active role for state and
nonstate actors in influencing international norm creation. Finally, Part
III will analyze the scholarship and legislative history surrounding both
FATCA and the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act in light of these changing
views of globalization.
I. NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION THEORY AND CAPITAL MOBILITY
Until the recent financial crisis, the neoliberal theory of
globalization represented the dominant globalization worldview behind
both national and transnational financial policymaking. 20 The neoliberal
view finds its origins in the 1944 Bretton-Woods Conference, an event
that, much like the current efforts to combat the 2008 financial crisis,
sought to redefine transnational financial structures and norms in the
wake of a massive systemic upheaval. 21 This view of globalization has
two principle characteristics: the primacy of market forces over state
sovereignty22 and the unrestricted transnational flow of capital.23
A. Rule of the Market
As Susan Strange notes, the erosion of state authority in favor of the
impartial and uncontrollable rule of the global market economy lies at
the core of the neoliberal theory of globalization:
20. See Gopal Balakrishnan, The Twilight of Capital?, in IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN AND
THE PROBLEM OF THE WORLD: SYSTEM, SCALE, CULTURE 227, 228 (David Palumbo-Liu et
al. eds., 2011) (noting the dominance of the Neo-Liberal view of globalization from end of
the Cold War to the start of the recent financial crisis).
21. Spencer, supra note 1, at 46.
22. Susan Strange, The Declining Authority of States, in THE GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 127, 128
(James N. Rosenau, ed. 2003).
23. See id. at 132 (asserting that the increasing costs of new technologies could not
have been covered without the increased capital mobility that has accompanied
globalization).
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The argument put forward is that the impersonal forces
of world markets, integrated over the postwar period
more by private enterprise in finance, industry[,] and
trade than by the cooperative decisions of governments,
are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate
political authority over society and economy is supposed
to belong.24
Strange, like other proponents of neoliberal view, cites several
factors in support of this worldview. To begin with, Strange points to the
fact that states have failed to provide many of the "fundamentals," such
as "security against violence, stable money for trade and investment, a
clear system of law and the means to enforce it, and a sufficiency of
public goods like drains, water supplies, infrastructure for transport
and communications," that most associate with the just exercise of state
authority. 25 These failings, Strange claims, have eroded popular respect
for the traditional authority of states.26 Furthermore, Strange argues
that many states have only aided the decay of their authority by
increasing government regulation in "marginal" matters such as
product safety and transportation systems, actions that she claims only
serve to "trivialize[] government" and further erode popular respect for
traditional state authority.27
The second and related factor Strange points to is the increasingly
rapid technological evolution that has occurred during the last
century. 28 The effect of this technological advancement proved twofold.
First, the dramatic increase in the destructiveness of weapons
technology has contributed to the erosion of public confidence in the
ability of state governments to defend their citizens. 29 Second, and
perhaps most important, the rapid proliferation of civilian technology
provided the catalyst for the creation of a consumer-driven, global,
capitalist economy in which gaining market share, not territory, brings
wealth and power.30 Strange claims that Germany and Japan provide
the best proof of this. Although both lost tremendous amounts of
territory after World War II, both states rapidly rose to positions of
power on the world stage, not through military might and capture of
24. Id. at 128.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 130.
29. See id. (asserting that the rise of nuclear weapons technology has eroded "one of
the primary reasons for the existence of the state[-]its capacity to repel attack by
others").
30. Id. at 131.
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territory, but through economic might and the capture of market
share.31 Because this economic power comes largely through the private
rather than public sector, transnational corporations and other private
actors have replaced many state governments as the choicest allies for
actors seeking to increase their economic power. 32 In short, although
states have become economically powerful under this neoliberal view of
globalization, they owe that power not to their traditional authority as
states, but to market forces beyond their control.33 They exist merely as
ships adrift on the impartial sea of the market. 34
B. Unrestricted Transnational Flows of Capital
Along with emphasizing the importance of market forces over state
authority, proponents of the neoliberal theory of globalization also
promote the importance of the unrestricted transnational flow of capital,
which they claim "eliminates much inefficiency[,] . . . applies capital
wherever it brings the highest returns[,] . . . disciplines lazy
management[,] and . . . offers far better opportunities for managing
risks."35 According to Strange, the aforementioned rapid advancement
has created a major need for unfettered capital mobility: as technology
has advanced, the capital costs for increased advancement have
increased in kind.36 Consequently, increased capital mobility is required
to maintain the increased wealth and power that technologic
advancement has afforded the global market economy.37
These principles of the neoliberal theory of globalization underlie
previous regulation of tax havens (or lack thereof). Proponents of this
view of globalization recognize the legitimate use of tax havens as just
another example of efficient use of capital resulting from unfettered
transnational capital mobility.38 Consequently, earlier domestic
attempts to limit or control the flow of capital to or from tax havens,
such as the U.S. Revenue Act of 1962, the Tax Reduction Act of 1975,
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, have witnessed stringent opposition
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 132-33 (asserting that "power ... is exercised impersonally by markets and
often unintentionally by those who buy and sell and deal in markets").
34. Id. at 133 (referring to state actors as "victims of the market economy").
35. David Spencer & J.C. Sharman, International Tax Cooperation (Part 1), 18 J. INT'L
TAX'N 34, at 35 (2007) (quoting Why Finance Will Not Be Unfettered, FINANCIAL TIMES,
June 25, 2007, at 10).
36. Strange, supra note 22, at 132.
37. Id.
38. Walter H. Diamond et al., TAX HAVENS OF THE WORLD INT-1 (2012).
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and have proven largely ineffective.39 Multinational efforts have proven
ineffective too, as the failure of the Organisation of Economic Co-
operation and Development's (OECD) "name and shame" campaign
against tax havens makes clear.40 Indeed, significant opposition toward
tax haven reform exists today, opposition still based on protecting the
unimpeded transnational flow of capital.41
II. EMERGING ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF GLOBALIZATION
Although still relevant, the preeminence of the neoliberal theory of
globalization has waned in the wake of the recent financial crisis, with
alternative theories emerging to challenge its long-held assumptions
about globalization. Two theories prove particularly relevant to this
note: Peter Evans's "counter-hegemonic globalization"42 and Harold
Koh's "transnational legal process."43
A. Counter-Hegemonic Globalization
Peter Evans's alternative theory of "counter-hegemonic
globalization" directly attacks the core neoliberal principle of guiding
market forces and unrestricted transnational capital flows. 44 However,
although they challenge basic assumptions about globalization, Evans's
39. Id. (noting how, in spite of these legislative efforts, more tax havens have come into
existence).
40. See Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
923, 927 (2010) (noting that tax havens continue to flourish despite the efforts of the
OECD).
41. See, e.g., Beckett G. Cantley, The Cure Causes New Symptoms: Capital Control
Effects of Tax Enforcement, Gold Regulation, and Retirement Reform, 7 S.C.J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 75, 97-98 (2010) (arguing that the tax haven regulations imposed by the HIRE Act
represent capital controls that will discourage U.S. investment abroad); Andrew P.
Morriss, Changing the Rules of the Game: Offshore Financial Centers, Regulatory
Competition & Financial Crisis, 15 NEXUS J. OP. 15, 17-18 (2009/2010) (arguing that tax
havens play an important role in directing efficient use of capital and in compelling state
governments to cede economic control to market forces); Daniel L. Hess, Change is Good,
Dollars are Better: Prospects for International Tax Reform, 20 J. INT'L TAX'N 1, 1, 5 (2009)
(arguing that the current administration's efforts at tax haven reform will place on an
unreasonable strain on U.S. business interests abroad); Kimberly Carlson, When Cows
Have Wings: An Analysis of the OECD's Tax Haven Work as It Relates to Globalization,
Sovereignty and Privacy, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV 163, 172-75 (2002) (arguing that the
OECD's efforts at multilateral tax haven regulation conflicted with the established
principles of globalization).
42. Peter Evans, Is an Alternative Globalization Possible?, 36 POL. & Soc'Y 271, 272
(2008).
43. Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 181 (1996).
44. Evans, supra note 42, at 272.
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assertions are not entirely novel; rather, he bases much of his argument
on Karl Polanyi's argument that "no socio-political order whose priority
is to give pre-eminence to the self-regulating market is sustainable."45
While acknowledging that the current system of globalization features
many elements inconsistent with the theoretical principles of neoliberal
globalization-such as "the persistent imposition of rules and resource
allocation based on the political interests of the powerful and despite
the growing importance of neo-mercantilist rivalries among major
powers"-Evans asserts that the "dominant elites" remain ideologically
committed to the neoliberal theory, thus rendering the current system
prey to the unsustainability Polanyi described.46 Evans argues that the
neoliberal theory of globalization has failed in two key ways:
The first is failure to construct social mechanisms for
doing what markets are inherently incapable of doing-
protecting people and nature from inordinate manmade
risks and from being treated as "externalities." The
second is inability to govern markets and discipline
capital so that capitalists themselves are protected from
the potential chaos of unregulated markets and are
compelled by competitive pressures to perform their
Smithian role of "revolutionizing the means of
production."47
The first failure of neoliberal globalization that Evan discusses
focuses on the inability of the theory to protect social rather than
economic benefits.48 Evans begins with the assumption that "nature and
markets generate risks" and that society, including both the public and
the private sector, has traditionally born the burden of guarding against
these risks.49 However, Evans argues that neoliberal globalization, with
its dismissal of state authority in favor of the rule of market forces, has
shifted these risks "from governments and corporations to individuals
with far less capacity to bear them."50 This, in turn, has led to a
decrease in the amount of social protection afforded individuals,
particularly in the realm of collective goods such as health care and
environmental protection.51 Evans argues that, rather than treating
45. Id.
46. Id. at 276.
47. Id. at 277.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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these collective goods as "fundamental components of social protection"
that generate "positive spillovers," neoliberal globalization treats them
merely as another "commodity," thus leading to an under-allocation of
resources toward these goods. 52 Furthermore, the negative effects
resulting from the under-protection of these collective goods have only
increased as development and population have increased.53 In essence,
Evans argues that the neoliberal system of globalization and its
enforcement of "the untrammeled reign of the self-regulated market"
fail to recognize the value of many social goods and the harm their
inadequate protection can cause. 54
Evans also criticizes neoliberalism's overemphasis on the value of
technological capital at the expense of human capital.55 Specifically,
Evans argues that, to protect the wealth and power provided by the
technological advances it has helped to create, neoliberal globalization
has permitted elites within the system to enforce monopolistic interests
in the most profitable technologies.56 Consequently, this enforcement of
monopoly interests over "intangible" technological capital has kept this
resource in the hands of only a chosen few and out of the hands of actors
rich in human capital, creating an imbalance in who actually realizes
the benefits of the self-regulating market for which the neoliberal
system of globalization does not account.5 7 Furthermore, contrary to the
claims of the neoliberal theory, Evans asserts that protection of
monopolies on technology actually hinders technological progress,
particularly when it comes to the development of technologies that are
key to protecting collective social goods such as drug and medical
technologies.58
Compounding these shortcomings is Evans's second great criticism
of neoliberal globalization: the lack of adequate governance of markets
and capital flows. 59 As mentioned above, Evans asserts that neoliberal
globalization's commitment to eliminating regulation in favor of a self-
regulating market has undermined the ability of state actors to provide
52. Id.
53. See id. at 277-78 (noting, for example, that inadequate protection of health care has
a significantly greater impact in a densely populated urban state today than in a sparsely
populated agrarian one a century ago).
54. Id. at 278.
55. Id.
56. Id. (noting, for example, the sole control exercised by Microsoft over Windows
software technology or by multinational pharmaceutical companies over drug formulas).
57. Id. at 278-79.
58. Id. at 279 (noting, for example, that the cost of HIV/AIDS drugs decreased by up to
98% after the monopoly rights of pharmaceutical companies expired).
59. Id. at 280.
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adequate protection of social-collective goods.60 However, Evans's
argument goes beyond this point to assert that economic growth has so
far outstripped any effective regulatory mechanisms, whether national
or global, that the economic as well as social health of the system has
begun to suffer.6' As to how adherence to the neoliberal theory could
lead to the opposite of the intended result, Evans provides a succinct
answer: "Genuine ideological conviction that regulation reduces
efficiency, combined with short-sighted self-interest in being able to
profit from the absence of governance, leaves neo-liberal elites incapable
of constructing even the order that they need for their own long-term
accumulation of capital."62 Crucial to the subject of this note, Evans
points out that the danger of harmful consequences resulting from a
lack of adequate governance has proven especially great in the financial
sector, where technological advances and the efforts to erode capital
controls have caused the growth of transnational capital flows to far
outpace any efforts to regulate them.63
To conclude, Evans argues that these failures have caused
substantial disillusionment with the neoliberal system of globalization
in the wake of the recent financial crisis, thus opening the door for an
alternative form of globalization to supplant the neoliberal elites (what
Evans calls "counter-hegemonic globalization"). 64 Although Evans
admits that he remains unsure as to exactly what form this "counter-
hegemonic globalization" will take,6 5 the opportunity this shift has
presented to challenge accepted globalization norms has already begun
to bear fruit, as we shall see later.
B. Transnational Legal Process
Unlike Evans, Koh does not directly attack the neoliberal system of
globalization. However, his theory of "transnational legal process" does
run contrary to the principles of neoliberal globalization by asserting
that states, along with a variety of other actors, can take action to
influence the creation and enforcement of evolving international norms:
"Transnational legal process describes the theory and practice of how
public and private actors-nation-states, international organizations,
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (pointing out how the number of global financial crises has increased along with
capital flows).
64. Id. at 281.
65. Id. (noting that the new globalization could take a variety of forms, from diversely
democratic, to hegemonic, to neo-nationalistic).
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multinational enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and private
individuals-interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and
international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately,
internalize rules of transnational law."66
Several factors of Koh's theory will prove relevant to this note's
study of tax haven reform. First, Koh asserts the theory is nonstatist,
meaning that state actors do not play the only or even the primary role
in the creation and enforcement of new international norms.67 At first
glance, this element may appear to support the neoliberal theory of
globalization. However, Koh's theory remains distinct from neoliberal
theory in that, although it denies state actors the exclusive role in
crafting and enforcing international norms, it still allows for a
substantial role for states alongside a variety of other nonstate actors.68
This stands in contrast to the neoliberal theory's relegation of state
actors to the role of mere puppets of an all-powerful market economy.69
Second, the transnational legal process is dynamic and constantly
evolving; under this process, "[t]ransnational law transforms, mutates,
and percolates up and down, from the public to the private, from the
domestic to the international level and back down again."7 0 The cyclical
nature of this evolutionary process also sets Koh's theory apart from
neoliberal globalization. Although neoliberal theory clearly allows for
development and evolution, it views the process as one in which the
market directs and enforces change rather than one where input from a
variety of actors at all levels can drive change.71
Third, the transnational legal process is normative, meaning that
the interaction of actors of all kinds at both the domestic and
transnational level leads to the creation, interpretation, and
enforcement of new transnational legal norms. 72 This point provides the
crux of Koh's argument against the neoliberal view, because it allows a
variety of state and nonstate actors to play an active, positive role in
shaping the course of globalization.
Thus, although Koh put forth his theory several years before the
recent financial crisis, these three elements of transnational legal
process and their deviation from the core principles of the neoliberal
theory of globalization make them particularly relevant to our
66. Koh, supra note 43, at 183-84.
67. See id. at 184.
68. See id.
69. See Strange, supra note 22, at 133.
70. See Koh, supra note 43, at 184.
71. See Strange, supra note 22, at 132-33.
72. See Koh, supra note 43, at 184.
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examination of the globalization shift embodied in the recent efforts at
tax haven reform.
III. EVIDENCE OF CHANGING VIEWS OF GLOBALIZATION IN TAX HAVEN
. REFORM
The scholarship and legislative history surrounding the recent
efforts at tax haven reform provide an excellent case study of the limited
shift away from the neoliberal view of globalization brought on by the
recent financial crisis. Of course, real-world actions will rarely, if ever,
perfectly adhere to theory, and this case proves no exception. To begin
with, nowhere in the legislative history surrounding both FATCA and
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act does explicit mention of any
globalization theory appear. Not surprisingly, the respective legislative
histories of each Act expressly point to much more politically relevant
motivations such as increasing tax revenue and decreasing the budget
deficit. 73
Furthermore, the recent efforts at tax haven reform represent a
mere limited shift away from the traditional neoliberal model, not an
absolute paradigm change. It remains worth remembering that, as of
writing of this note, the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act has not yet passed
despite repeated introductions in Congress. 74 This fact alone indicates
that members of the government (and possibly the business interests
that lobby them) remain uncomfortable with threatening the perceived
economic benefits of transnational capital flows with legislation
targeting tax havens. Indeed, some of the legislative history
surrounding the reform efforts explicitly expresses a desire to protect
positive aspects of the neoliberal globalization regime.75
However, although the recent tax haven reform efforts signal
nothing as dramatic as the death of the neoliberal globalization regime
and the rise of a new globalization order, they do provide evidence of a
73. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. S6221 (daily ed. May 17, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kent
Conrad) (asserting that approximately $100 billion in tax revenue is lost annually due to
use of offshore tax havens); 153 CONG. REC. S3688 (daily ed. March 23, 2007) (statement
of Sen. Carl Levin) (arguing that tax haven reform can increase tax revenue and decrease
the annual budget deficit).
74. See S. 681, supra note 5; H.R. 2136, supra note 5; S. 506, supra note 6; H.R. 1265,
supra note 6; S. 1346, supra note 7; H.R. 2669, supra note 7; H.R. 1554, supra note 8; S.
1533, supra note 8; H.R. 3666, supra note 8.
75. See 158 CONG. REC. S5104 (daily ed. July 18, 2012) (statement of Sen. Joseph
Durbin) (asserting that the tax haven reform efforts he supports do nothing to "impinge[
on any individual's right to hold financial interests anywhere in the world"); 154 Cong.
Rec. S2098 (daily ed. March 13, 2008) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (distinguishing
between abusive tax shelters and congressionally sanctioned tax shelters).
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limited but significant shift away from the core principles of neoliberal
globalization theory. This evidence appears in both (a) the statements
and actions of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and private
actors surrounding the reform efforts and (b) the legal scholarship
analyzing the reform efforts.
A. Evidence of the Shift in the Statements and Actions of Governments
and Private Actors
Evidence of this shift in the view of globalization and the state's role
in it can be seen first and foremost in the statements and actions of the
U.S. government, foreign governments, and private actors. To begin
with, while the legislative history surrounding FATCA and the Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act never explicitly references a new globalization theory,
it does provide evidence of both a recognition of the negative
consequences of unfettered transnational capital flows and a belief in
the ability of the state to play a positive, active role in correcting those
negative effects.
First, the legislative history surrounding the acts paints a decidedly
negative picture of tax havens and their use by U.S. individuals and
corporations to decrease the amount of taxes paid to the U.S.
government; such activity is labeled as "offshore trickery,"76 "monkey
business,"77 "a giant shell game," and "an enormous tax scam." 78 Those
who engage in such activity are called "tax dodgers"79 and "tax cheats"
who use "high-priced accountants, lawyers, and banks" to transfer a
large portion of their U.S. tax burden "onto the backs of honest
taxpayers."80 Even more significantly, the legislative history accuses
these tax havens and those who make use of them of "undermining the
integrity of our tax system"81 and driving a financial "race to the
bottom."82 Although one could attribute some of the severity of this
language to mere political verbosity, one cannot ignore the fact that
such negative portrayals of what can only be described as a form of
transnational capital flow conflict with the previously accepted sunny
picture painted by neoliberal globalization theory. Furthermore, the
contemporaneous acknowledgement by conservative economic minds of
the market's failure to effectively regulate capital flows suggests this
76. 157 CONG. REc. S4518 (daily ed. July 12, 2011) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
77. 153 CONG. REC. S3660 (daily ed. March 23, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kent Conrad).
78. 153 CONG. REc. S6221, supra note 73 (statement of Sen. Kent Conrad).
79. 157 CONG. REC. S4519 (daily ed. July 12, 2011) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
80. 154 CONG. REc. S2098, supra note 75 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
81. Id.
82. 158 CONG. REc. H5286 (daily ed. July 25, 2012) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank).
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language amounts to more than mere liberal rhetoric.83 Rather, by
accusing tax havens of undermining the strength of the U.S. legal
system and decreasing the amount of tax revenue available for funding
government programs, these statements echo Evan's criticism that
strict adherence to the self-regulating market of neoliberal globalization
can harm social goods.84
However, evidence provided by the legislative history challenges not
just the sanctity of transnational capital flows promoted in neoliberal
thinking but the role of the state in influencing those flows as well.
Unlike the almost fatalistic view of the decay of state power in the wake
of market forces embraced by the neoliberal theory, 85 the statements
found in the legislative history argue that the United States can and
should take action to regulate these capital flows. 86 Indeed, the
statements in the legislative history come close to explicitly rejecting
neoliberal theory by chiding members of Congress for tacitly accepting
the ongoing use of tax havens in failing to take regulatory action against
them87 and by refusing to accept a "philosophy" that requires the United
States to "match other countries in an absence of rules."8 8 Such
statements indicate no wringing of the hands and no bowing to the rule
of the market; rather, they assert an active, positive role for the state in
regulating and shaping the path of globalization as envisioned in Koh's
transnational legal theory.8 9
The evidence of this theoretical shift is not limited to the statements
and actions of the U.S. government, however; several other states have
taken steps that indicate their concurrence with the views underlying
these tax haven reform efforts. For example, France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and the United Kingdom have worked with the United States to
try to establish a framework for the information sharing and disclosure
83. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at Bi, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/
economy/24panel.html?_r=0 ("[A] humbled Mr. Greenspan admitted that he had put too
much faith in the self-correcting power of free markets . . .
84. See Evans, supra note 42, at 278.
85. See Strange, supra note 22, at 132-33.
86. See 157 CONG. REC. S4519, supra note 79 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); 154
CONG. REC. S2098, supra note 75 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); 153 CONG. REc. S6221,
supra note 73 (statement of Sen. Kent Conrad); 153 CONG. REC. S3660, supra note 77
(statement of Sen. Kent Conrad).
87. See CONG. REC. S6221, supra note 73 (statement of Sen. Kent Conrad) ("Shame on
us if we are being fooled. But currently, we are.")
88. 158 CONG. REC. H5286, supra note 82 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank).
89. See Koh, supra note 43, at 184.
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mandated under FATCA.90 Perhaps even more telling, Liechtenstein, a
well-known tax haven, has indicated a willingness to adopt
international standards of information disclosure to prevent misuse of
its secretive banking services.91
Evidence of these changing views comes from beyond the state level
as well; many private actors have indicated a willingness to embrace
greater regulation of capital flows. One of the most notable examples is
Swiss banking giant UBS, which agreed to disclose information on and
to close the accounts of several U.S. clients in 2009.92 UBS does not
stand alone among private actors in taking steps to comply with recent
tax haven reform efforts; the IRS has received "well over" 7,500
applications for FATCA's voluntary offshore disclosure program.93
These actions by private actors, along with those of foreign state
actors discussed above, further conform to Koh's theory of transnational
legal process: not only do they provide broad evidence of state and
nonstate actors playing an active role in shaping transnational norms,94
but they also provides examples of the dynamic and normative power of
their interactions. 95 One can trace the path of norm creation,
interpretation, and enforcement from the beginning of reform efforts at
the state level in the U.S., to interpretation of what those reform efforts
will mean at the transnational level, to further interpretation and the
beginnings of adoption and enforcement of some new tax haven norms
at both the national and the transnational level by both state and
nonstate actors. Thus, the statements and actions of the U.S.
government, foreign governments, and private actors surrounding these
two pieces of legislation and related tax haven reform efforts provide
significant evidence of a limited shift away from the neoliberal model of
globalization to a model that allows for some regulation of capital flows
and envisions a significant role for state and nonstate actors in crafting
those regulatory norms.
90. See Bruce Zagaris, Bilateral Agreement Alternative to FATCA Implementation
Brings New Twist to International Tax Cooperation, 28 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 113,
113 (2012).
91. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 56-57.
92. See Bruce Zagaris, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Holds
Second Hearing on Tax Haven Banks in the UBS Case, 25 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 183
(2009).
93. Bruce Zagaris, House Ways & Means Subcommittee Shows Support for Foreign
Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance, 26 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 31, 31
(2010).
94. See Koh, supra note 43, at 184.
95. See id.
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B. Evidence of the Shift in Legal Scholarship
Along with the evidence provided by the reform efforts, much of the
legal scholarship analyzing those reform efforts also provides evidence
of a limited shift in the globalization paradigm. First, many of the
articles of legal scholarship critiquing FATCA and the Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act acknowledge that states can and should play an active role in
regulating transnational capital flows, even those that oppose the
specific methods embodied in these pieces of legislation.9 6 Such
acknowledgement means that, while they many disagree on the proper
means of regulation, many legal scholars do endorse Koh's argument
that state actors can play a positive and active role in creating
transnational regulatory norms.9 7
In tandem with this acknowledgment of the ability of states to
regulate transnational capital flows, many legal scholars have also
acknowledged the potential negative effects of tax havens and the
unregulated capital flows. Timothy Addison, for example, argues that
allowing the unregulated tax flows that permit the abusive use of tax
havens decreases aggregate social welfare by allowing individuals to
pay less in taxes than the cost of the public benefits they enjoy.9 8 This
argument closely mirrors one of Evans's major criticisms of the
neoliberal theory of globalization-that it provides inadequate
protection of social goods.9 9
Furthermore, several legal scholars have argued that unfettered
capital flows have led directly to the proliferation of offshore tax havens.
Adam Rosenzweig, for instance, argues that tax havens arise out of
what he calls the "capital neutrality paradox." 00 By this he means that,
because states have sought to realize the economic benefits of
globalization by allowing the free transnational flow of capital and
avoiding double taxation (i.e., taxing the same funds twice, abroad and
at home) to maintain "capital neutrality," they have unintentionally
created the incentives for states to act as tax havens:
The problem is that there is a cost to making capital
more mobile in addition to a benefit: the more mobile
96. E.g., Morriss, supra note 41, at 15 ("Even ardent proponents of free markets often
concede a significant role for the state in providing the 'rules of the game' for market
competition . . . "); Cantley, supra note 41, at 108 ('The United States has legitimate
articulated reasons for implementing tax haven enforcement overseas. . .
97. See Koh, supra note 43, at 184.
98. See Addison, supra note 4, at 708-09.
99. Evans, supra note 42, at 278.
100. Rosenzweig, supra note 40, at 930-31.
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capital becomes, the more easily countries can use tax
incentives to attract such capital. In other words, one
country focusing on double taxation relief can make tax
competition a cheaper and more readily available
instrument for other countries to attract capital.101
Although Rosenzweig acknowledges that this causal relationship
does not necessarily mean that the negative effects of incentivizing tax
havens will outweigh the benefits of capital neutrality, 102 his argument
about the "capital neutrality paradox" conforms to Evan's criticism of
the neoliberal theory of globalization. It draws a direct line between the
neoliberal adherence to unrestricted capital flows and the decreased
aggregate social welfare caused by loss of tax revenue to tax havens.
Finally, some of the legal scholarship on the recent efforts at tax
reform echo Koh's theory of transnational legal process by analyzing the
ability of state and nonstate actors to craft new transnational tax
norms. For example, Allison Christians argues that "tax law emerges
and evolves through iterative interactions among politicians,
lawmakers, administrators, practitioners, taxpayers, advocates, the
media, and academics," and points to how comparison and peer pressure
among members of the OECD have influenced their respective tax law
regimes.103 In tracing the path of tax law formation from the state level;
to the transnational level of the OECD; to the state level again as
Member States influence, interpret, and internalize new tax norms,
Christians's argument almost mirrors Koh's language describing the
dynamic process of norm formation. 104
Thus, legal scholarship analyzing the recent efforts at tax haven
reform further reflects the limited shift away from the neoliberal theory
of globalization to a new paradigm that recognizes the benefits of capital
flow regulation and the ability of both state and nonstate actors to
realize it.
101. Id. at 931. See also Addison, supra note 4, at 711 (noting the incentive to offer
competitive tax rates as a driving force behind tax haven proliferation); Morriss, supra
note 41, at 18-19 (identifying offering tax shelter services as a means for states to compete
for economic investment).
102. See Rosenzweig, supra note 40, at 930-31.
103. Allison Christians, Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy, 9 Wash. U. Global
Stud. L. Rev. 1, 29-32 (2010). See also Morse, supra note 18, at 727-28 (analyzing FATCA
in the context of tax norm formation between OECD member states).
104. See Koh, supra note 43, at 184.
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CONCLUSION
The recent financial crisis has led to a widespread reexamination of
global financial norms, including the transnational free flow of capital.
Efforts at tax haven reform, most notably FATCA and the Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act, and the legislative history and legal scholarship
surrounding them, provide evidence of a limited shift away from the
traditional neoliberal theory of globalization to one that both recognizes
the potentially positive benefits of transnational capital regulation and
envisions an active role for both state and nonstate actors in creating,
adapting, and enforcing those regulations. Time will tell whether this
shift will continue or what other areas of globalization it may impact.
However, if this alternative thinking about globalization can impact an
area of transnational finance as significant as tax havens and a
principle of globalization as essential as capital flows, it seems likely
that globalization thinking will continue to evolve.

